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Building codes and code enforcement have been criticized by governmental 
commissions and academic experts for unnecessarily increasing the costs of new 
construction in central cities, thereby reducing the ability of builders and 
developers to provide affordable housing and compete successfully with suburban 
areas. In this paper, we examine empirically the effects of the stringency of code 
enforcement on central city housing construction. We show that the code 
enforcement choices central cities make can limit their ability to compete with 
suburban areas for new single-family-detached and multi-family housing. We also 
show that minor changes in strategy will not alter this effect. Analyses presented 
are based on data on code enforcement practices and housing construction 
activity between 1985 and 1995 assembled from a nationally representative 
sample of 155 central cities and their metropolitan areas.  
 
__________________________________________ 
 
Building codes regulate residential construction in virtually every central city in 
the United States. These codes consist of standards and specifications designed to 
provide minimum safeguards in the construction of buildings to protect the people who 
live and work in them from the dangers of building collapse. While they obviously are 
important for public safety, building codes have been blamed by a series of national 
commissions and academic experts for the crisis in affordable housing in the United 
States and for the inability of central cities to compete successfully for economic growth 
(e.g., Downs 1991; Dowall and Landis 1982; Dowall 1984; Field and Rivkin, 1976 
Fischel, 1990). 
 
Here are what three national commissions had to say. The National Commission 
on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission) first brought the problem to light in 1969. 
According to the Commission’s final report, Building the American City, “…their 
influence extends beyond the physical relationships that are their primary concern, 
affecting such diverse matters as employment opportunity, housing opportunity, and local 
tax rates…. Critics charge that regulations act to reinforce racial and economic 
segregation, raise the costs of housing and stifle interesting and innovative design” (page 
199). President Reagan’s Commission on Housing concluded in 1982 that the supply of 
housing could be increased if cities substantially deregulated the development process 
(President’s Commission on Housing 1982). In 1991, the Advisory Commission on 
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing came to a similar conclusion. In the 
Commission’s report, Not in My Backyard: Removing Barriers to Affordable Housing 
(1991), it cited building codes and other development regulations as a serious obstacle to 
affordability. The commission found that “Local building codes often are not geared to 
supporting cost-effective construction of affordable housing,” and that “Virtually all of 
the construction work in (central) cities consists of infill and rehabilitation rather than 
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large tracts of new homes built on open land, necessitating that city officials rethink their 
regulations” (Page 3-1). 
 The primary targets of regulatory reform and primary subject of most previous 
research on this subject has been building code standards and, more broadly, restrictive 
land-use regulations. Building code standards are formulated by three large model code 
groups and then adopted (and modified in the process of adoption) by states and local 
governments. (The principal model code group in the East and Midwest is the Building 
Officials Conference of America—Basic Building Code; in the West, the International 
Conference of Building Officials—Uniform Building Code; and in the South, the 
Southern Building Code Congress International—Southern Standard Building Code.)  
Land-use regulations are embodied in thousands of local zoning, subdivision, and other 
development regulations. Changing building code standards is a highly technical, tedious, 
time-consuming, and politically contentious process that often takes years to accomplish. 
Local development regulations are easier to alter, but substantial change still requires 
considerable effort (staff and political) to accomplish. As a result of the difficulties of 
making significant changes in codes, once they have been adopted, little progress has 
been made in dealing with the problem of unreasonable code standards, as the reports 
over a twenty-two-year period of the three national commissions indicate. 
The impacts of code standards, however, depend not only on the standards 
themselves but also on the manner in which they are administered. All model codes 
permit local officials to accept alternate materials or methods that will improve the 
efficiency and reduce the costs of urban development and rehabilitation. Local officials 
also have the discretion to enforce codes in a flexible fashion that relaxes standards and 
other rules that make little sense in given applications but increase costs substantially.  
This local discretion may provide an important means to alleviate the building code 
burden on central cities and allow them to compete more successfully for housing 
construction (and the population that comes with it) within their metropolitan areas. 
The conventional wisdom has been that few local governments use the discretion 
they have available (see, for example, Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to 
Affordable Housing 1991: 3-7). However, we believe the conventional wisdom may be 
incorrect. In this paper, we describe the code enforcement strategies being pursued by 
central cities in the United States and examine their effects on central city success in 
capturing new housing construction within their metropolitan areas. We show that 
enforcement strategies vary widely, and that a number of local governments do use the 
discretion they have available to facilitate new construction. Our analyses indicate that 
strict enforcement does, in fact, hinder the ability of central cities to capture a larger 
share of the market for new single-family-detached and multi-family housing within 
metropolitan areas. Furthermore, we show that minor changes in strategy, such as 
increasing the flexibility with which codes are enforced, will not alter this effect. Instead, 
central cities that have embraced a strict approach to enforcement will need to completely 
rethink their enforcement strategies, if they want to be more successful in competing with 
suburban areas for new housing construction. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data 
collection procedures we used to gather information on code enforcement and to explore 
the effects of enforcement on housing construction in central cities relative to their 
metropolitan areas. We then present our conceptualization of code enforcement systems 
and look at the code enforcement strategies actually being employed by central cities. We 
then report the results of analyses of the association of code enforcement strategy with 
housing construction. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the 
findings for central city code enforcement policy. 
 
The Data 
In order to characterize the enforcement actions of central cities and their effects 
on housing construction, we extracted data for 155 central cities from a national database 
assembled in 1995 through a mail survey of city and county building code enforcement 
agencies (see Burby, May and Paterson 1998). The response rate for the mail survey was 
82 percent after a post card follow-up and two additional follow-ups with replacement 
questionnaires. In order to provide a representative profile of central city code 
enforcement and its effect on housing construction, the sample data are weighted on the 
basis of each state’s proportion of the total number of central city governments in the 
United States. Comparison of the sample of 155 central cities with the universe of 362 
central cities in the U.S. in 1990 indicates that the sample over-represents larger central 
cities. However, the sample of central cities does not differ from the remainder of central 
cities in terms of per capita income in 1990, or the percentage of population growth, 
percentage of income growth, and percentage of employment growth between 1980 and 
1990. Thus, we believe the sample data are reasonably representative of all central cities.  
 
Central city success in attracting single-family and multi-family housing 
construction, our dependent variables, is measured with respect to the number of housing 
units constructed in each central city relative to its surrounding metropolitan area. For 
each type of housing, we calculated the per capita ratio of building permits issued by 
central cities over the eleven-year period 1985-1995 in relation to the corresponding 
permits issued for the metropolitan area in which the central city is located. Data from 
individual jurisdictions in metropolitan areas were spatially aggregated for each year of 
the study period based on the 1993 Census definition of each metropolitan area. The data 
were aggregated over an eleven-year period in order to include a complete business cycle 
that takes into account periods of peak construction, downturns and upturns, and periods 
of recession. Per capita values are used to control for variation across central cities and 
metropolitan areas in population.  
 
The measurement of enforcement practices, strategies, and effort is discussed in 
the following section. To isolate enforcement effects on housing construction, we used 
OLS regression analysis in which we controlled statistically for other factors, in addition 
to enforcement, that can affect the success of central cities in capturing single-family-
detached and multi-family housing construction within their metropolitan areas. The 
selection of control variables is based on literature and theorizing about key decision-
making considerations for homebuilders and multi-family developers. In this regard, a 
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key premise is that construction decisions hinge on considerations of financial feasibility. 
That is, housing projects will not be undertaken unless the cost of a potential project is 
less than expected project value. Cost depends on the cost of inputs—land, labor, and 
materials—used for capital outlays and for operating expenses and indirectly on the cost 
of local public facilities and services. Value depends on expected sales price and rental 
income. This, in turn, is a function of market conditions—local demand and supply, local 
quality of life and climate for development, credit availability, and national economic 
conditions. Based on this conceptualization, we formulated indicators to capture the 
effects that cost and value can have on construction activity in central cities relative to 
their metropolitan areas. In addition, we take into account the potential effects of the size 
of each metropolitan market area and its economic attractiveness relative to other 
metropolitan areas. Measurement of the dependent, policy, and control variables is 
described further in the appendix. 
 
Code Enforcement Practices and Strategies 
 
Our conceptualization of building code enforcement draws on previous theorizing 
about regulatory enforcement (e.g., see Kagan 1994) and builds on our earlier work on 
code enforcement systems and their effects on compliance with code standards and on 
economic development (e.g., see Burby, May and Paterson, 1998; May and Burby, 1998; 
and Burby et al. 2000). Here we focus on three related enforcement concepts: practice, 
strategy, and effort. An agency practice is the most fundamental of these concepts. 
Practices can be easily observed in the field. These consist of such things as supervising 
field staff, carrying out inspections, issuing notices of violation and field citations, and 
providing technical assistance. Agency strategy consists of combinations of the practices 
that agencies pursue, either explicitly or implicitly, to enhance their effectiveness in 
bringing about compliance. For example, an agency can pursue a strict enforcement 
strategy that involves the use of a number of coercive practices, or it can emphasize other 
practices, such as the use of incentives. Finally, effort refers to the vigor with which 
agencies pursue enforcement. In this regard, some agencies are proactive in employing 
enforcement practices and strategies while others are more dormant. 
 
To measure enforcement practices we created a set of indexes that correspond to 
different actions identified in the enforcement literature: standardization and supervision, 
deterrent enforcement, technical assistance, discretionary enforcement, and use of 
incentives. The items within each category of practice are shown in Table 1. For each 
category, we created a summated index from the individual items, based on central city 
enforcement agency reports of the use of the different tools. Summary statistics for each 
index and measures of reliability (Chronbach’s alpha) are provided in the appendix. 
 
Several points about the enforcement practices that we measured are important to 
note. First, these are measures of the use of different practices and not whether they 
simply exist on paper or not. As such, they reflect actions of code enforcement agencies. 
Second, the amount of effort put into different practices is not included in these 
measures. Third, by constructing indexes of different practices our analysis is at a more 
aggregate-level than considering individual practices one-by-one. This has an advantage 
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of increasing the reliability of measures and enables us to talk about categories of 
practices that are consistent with those discussed in the regulatory literature. 
 
 
Table 1. Enforcement Practices of Central City Code Enforcement Agencies 
1.  Standardization and Supervision Practices 
• Inspection checklists and forms  
• Agency policy or procedure manual 
• Periodic review of inspectors' work 
• Inspectors required to consult supervisor/building official on hard calls  
• Rotate field inspectors' territories 
• Intensive training of inspectors in agency policy and procedures 
• Annual performance evaluation of inspectors 
• Follow-up field inspections of inspectors' work 
• Productivity measures used to evaluate inspectors' work 
2.  Deterrent Practices 
• Notice of violation 
• Notice of corrective action  
• Stop work order  
• Revocation of building permit  
• Revocation of certificate of occupancy  
• Temporary restraining order  
• Preliminary injunction  
• Permanent injunction  
• Infraction field citation/fine 
• Misdemeanor prosecution/fine 
• Fine levied for working without permit in past 12 months 
• Fine levied for not following approved plan in past 12 months 
• Fine levied for not following code provisions in past 12 months  
3.  Technical Assistance Practices 
• One-on-one technical assistance during plan review  
• One-on-one technical assistance at construction site 
• Booklets describing code enforcement procedures and policies  
• Workshops to explain code provisions  
• Newsletter, bulletin  
• Self-contained slide, audio, or video cassette modules  
 
4.  Discretionary Practices 
• Inspectors authorized to bluff in order to attain compliance  
• Inspectors allowed to be lenient when life safety not threatened  
• Inspectors can spend extra time on site to develop good relations with regulated 
• Inspectors can badger contractors who are chronic violators  
• Inspectors can relax standards based on extenuating circumstances  
 
5. Incentive Practices 
• Prior record of violator taken into account in decision to prosecute 
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• Attitude of violator taken into account in decision to prosecute  
• Less frequent inspections  
• Bend over backward to be cordial  
• Other incentives  
• Modify standards for firms with good records with approval of higher authority 
 
 
Our measures of effort that agencies put into different activities are based on 
ratings provided by code enforcement agencies. These provide relative ratings among 
seven different categories of activities (public information, surveillance, plan checking, 
inspection, legal prosecution, technical assistance, and public relations). 
 
The enforcement strategy of a given agency can be characterized in terms of the 
mix of different practices that the agency chooses to pursue. We think of strategy as a 
bundle of discrete choices concerning such things as inspection, technical assistance, and 
use of deterrence. In order to identify enforcement strategies in practice, we employed 
iterative cluster analysis to identify three groupings of code enforcement agencies with 
similarities in use of different practices.1 By examining the practices employed by the 
central cities in each group, we could deduce the strategy it employed to bring about 
compliance with code standards. We labeled these strategies as strict, creative, and 
accommodative.  
 
The cities that employ each strategy are shown in Table 2. An accommodative 
strategy was being used by the largest percentage of cities (43 percent), followed by 
cities using a creative strategy (29 percent), and those using a strict strategy (28 percent). 
The attributes of each cluster are shown in Table 3. The first set of entries lists the mean 
scores for the practices used to label each strategy. Each set of practices is an index 
measured on a scale of zero to 100. Central cities that used a strict enforcement strategy 
are noteworthy for their emphasis on standardization of fieldwork and provision of 
technical assistance. Those that employed a creative enforcement strategy stand out for 
their use of flexible enforcement practices and use of incentives. Both strict and creative 
strategies feature relatively large doses of deterrence. The cities that employed an 
accommodative strategy used more flexible enforcement practices than the strict 
enforcement group, but used fewer of each of the other types of practices than cities that 
used strict or creative strategies. This is also reflected in enforcement effort, which 
tended to be lowest among the cities that pursued an accommodative strategy. 
 
Our characterization of enforcement strategies is consistent with other studies in 
showing that agencies employ a mix of practices. What we found, however, differs in 
important details from the stylized versions of enforcement strategy found in the 
literature. In particular, deterrence tends to be employed in equal measure by agencies 
that employed strict and creative enforcement strategies and both groups of agencies 
made a strong effort to enforce code requirements. What separates the strategies of these 
agencies is the use of flexibility and incentives. These are added to the enforcement 
strategy of agencies that have to cope with a more highly politicized environment and 
have more opposition to strong enforcement from constituencies such as builders, 
developers, and contractors (shown in the bottom rows of Table 3). 
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Our finding that a large proportion of code enforcement agencies follows an 
accommodative strategy is not as easily characterized and not found as a separate 
strategy in the literature. It might be considered as similar to what Kagan (1994) labels as 
a retreatist approach for which regulatory officials, with more limited support for strong 
enforcement, merely create an appearance of enforcement. As shown in the bottom rows 
of Table 3, an accommodative strategy is likely to also be a response to economic 
circumstances. Cities that used an accommodative strategy, as a group, tended to be 
poorer, growing at a slower rate, and experiencing weaker economies than cities that 
used strict or creative enforcement strategies.  
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Table 2. Enforcement Strategies Used by U. S. Central Cities, 1995 
 
Enforcement Strategya 
Strict (N= 43 –  28%) Creative(N=45–29%) Accommodative (N= 67 – 43%) 
Abilene Albany Akron Peoria 
Albany Amarillo Albuquerque Pittsburgh 
Allentown Ann Arbor Baltimore Portland, ME 
Anchorage Bloomington Beaumont Rapid City 
Asheville Boston Billings San Antonio 
Austin Brockton Binghamton Santa Fe 
Bakersfield Cedar Rapids Bridgeport Springfield 
Baton Rouge Cincinnati Brownsville Syracuse 
Bellingham Dayton Bryan Tacoma 
Birmingham Duluth Buffalo Tallahassee 
Boise Eau Claire Charleston, WV Terre Haute 
Charleston, SC Eugene Cleveland Toledo 
Chicago Erie Columbia Trenton 
Columbus Fargo Corpus Christi Tucson 
Dallas Fort Lauderdale Danbury Tyler 
El Paso Gainesville Davenport Tuscaloosa 
Fort Wayne Gary Des Moines Utica 
Huntsville Grand Rapids Detroit Waco 
Jackson Greensboro Dothan Waterbury 
Lake Charles Huntington Dubuque Wilmington 
Las Cruces Indianapolis Flint Worcester 
Little Rock Las Vegas  Fort Worth Yuma 
Los Angeles Lynchburg Great Falls  
Madison Lincoln Greenville  
New York City Macon Houston  
Orlando Milwaukee Jacksonville  
Philadelphia Minneapolis Kalamazoo  
Phoenix New Bedford Knoxville  
Reno Oakland Lancaster  
Riverside Portland, OR Lansing  
Rochester Providence Laredo  
Sacramento Provo Lawrence  
Salt Lake City Richmond Lexington  
Santa Barbara Roanoke Louisville  
San Diego Rochester Lubbock  
San Francisco Rockford Manchester  
San Jose Salinas Mansfield  
Spokane Santa Rosa Miami  
Stockton Savannah Monroe  
Tampa Seattle Montgomery  
Tulsa Sioux City Muncie  
Vineland Sioux Falls New Orleans  
Virginia Beach South Bend Odessa  
 Springfield Oxnard  
 Vallejo Paterson  
facilitative practices (flexible application of rules and use of incentives). Accommodative enforcement 
strategies use low degrees of both systematic and facilitative practices. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Cities with Different Enforcement Strategies 
Mean Values For Clusters  
Comprising Different Strategies a 
 
Characteristic 
Strict 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Creative 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Accommodative 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Enforcement Practices that Comprise the 
Strategy  
   
Standardization of Fieldwork 85 65 53 
Deterrent Enforcement Practices 58 59 46 
Technical Assistance Practices 75 56 36 
Flexible Enforcement Practices 40 72 47 
Incentive Practices 29 46 10 
Enforcement Effort Associated with the 
Strategy 
   
Overall Enforcement Effort  74 74 67 
City Characteristics Associated with Use of 
Each Strategy 
   
   Population, 1990 623,780 195,030 210,806 
   Population Growth, 1980-89 (percentage) 15 8 5 
   Median Per Capita Income, 1989  $14,084 $13,070 $12,319 
   Unemployment Rate, 1990 (percentage) 6.8 7.1 8.3 
   Median Home Value, 1990 $96,847 $74,960 $70,620 
   Housing Built Prior to 1940 (percentage) 18 26 26 
   Political Demand for Enforcement 51 53 39 
   Political Opposition to Enforcement 19 25 16 
   Politicization of Enforcement   2 16 15 
Cluster Sample Information    
Number of Cases (weighted) 43 47 65 
Percent of Sample 
 
28 30 42 
 
Notes: 
a Except for the cluster sample information, cell entries are the mean values of designated items for central 
cities that comprise the designated strategy (cluster) for the weighted sample of central city enforcement 
agencies. The difference of means F-test is statistically significant at p < .05 for all items except housing 
built prior to 1940, political opposition, and politicization, which are significant at p < .10. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Impacts of Enforcement Choices on Housing Construction 
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 At issue is the question of whether a strict enforcement strategy has constrained 
housing construction in the central cities that have used it. Equally important is the 
question of whether creative and accommodative strategies, each of which employs more 
flexibility in dealing with builders and contractors, has mitigated this adverse effect in the 
cities where these strategies have been employed. To investigate these questions, we ran 
multiple regression models that control for other factors that can affect central city 
success in capturing housing construction activity within their metropolitan areas. 
 The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 4. The columns labeled 
model A use strict and accommodative dummy variables to estimate the effects of central 
city approaches to enforcement. The columns labeled model B look at the effects of strict 
and creative enforcement strategies. Our discussion of the model findings looks first at 
the effects of enforcement strategy on single-family detached housing and then at effects 
on multi-family housing. 
 
Model A indicates that relative to a strategy of creative enforcement (the omitted 
dummy variable), strict enforcement had little effect on central city success in attracting 
single-family detached housing over the period 1985-1995, while an accommodative 
strategy had a fairly strong, statistically significant positive effect. The positive effects of 
the accommodative strategy are also shown by the results of Model B, which shows that 
relative to accommodative enforcement, both strict and creative enforcement have 
statistically significant negative effects on the proportion of single-family detached 
housing central cities were able to capture. In contrast to enforcement strategy, we find 
that enforcement effort has only a modest (and statistically insignificant) negative effect 
on the construction of single-family-detached housing in central cities relative to their 
metropolitan areas. We turn to this finding in more detail below. 
 
The single-family-detached housing model summarized in Column B indicates 
that the negative effect of a systematic approach to enforcement is not ameliorated by the 
greater employment of flexibility and incentives associated with a creative enforcement 
strategy. Both strict and creative enforcement strategies have an equivalent negative 
effect on the ratio of single-family detached housing captured by central cities. This 
occurs because both strategies rely heavily on the use of deterrent enforcement practices. 
In a separate analysis employing the index of deterrent practices (see Table 1) in place of 
enforcement strategy we found that deterrence is negatively associated with construction 
of single-family detached houses (beta = -.15, p < .01). In contrast, an accommodative 
strategy (as shown in Model A) that is characterized by little attention to deterrence has a 
positive effect on the construction of new homes. 
 
 In the case of multi-family housing, we find that enforcement strategy has little 
effect on the ability of central cities to capture new multi-family housing units. However,  
Table 4. Multiple Regression Models of Success of Central Cities in Capturing Housing 
Construction Activity in Metropolitan Areas, 1985-1995 
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 Standardized Regression Coefficientsa  
 Single-Family Housing Units  Multi-family Housing Units  
Variables Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Enforcement choices     
 Strict enforcement strategy -.01 -.14**  .06  .10 
 Accommodative enforcement strategy  .15** --- -.04 --- 
 Creative enforcement strategy --- -.14*** ---  .04 
 Enforcement effort -.04 -.04 -.18** -.18** 
 
Other explanatory variables: 
    
Demand for housing     
   Population-proportion of  
     metropolitan population living in 
     city, 1990 
 
 
 .42*** 
 
 
 .42*** 
 
 
 .22** 
 
 
 .22** 
   Income-ratio of city to metropolitan  
     area median per capita income,  
    1990 
 
  
 .28*** 
 
 
 .28*** 
 
 
 .13 
 
 
 .13 
   Spending power – ratio of city to 
     metropolitan area per capita retail  
     sales, 1982 
 
 
 .20** 
 
 
 .20** 
 
 
 .44*** 
 
 
 .44*** 
   Population growth (metro area),  
      1980-1989 
  
-.002 
 
-.002 
 
-.03 
 
-.03 
   Income growth per capita (metro 
      Area), 1980–1989 
 
-.04 
 
-.04 
 
 .09 
 
 .09 
Development opportunities     
   Land area-percentage increase in  
     City land area, 1980-1989 
 
 .10* 
 
 .10* 
 
-.004 
 
-.004 
   Obsolescence-1990 ratio of city to  
     metropolitan area percentage of  
     housing built prior to 1940 
 
 
-.28*** 
 
 
-.28*** 
 
 
-.17* 
 
 
-.17* 
   Housing shortage (metro area), 1990  .09*  .09*  .06  .06 
Development costs     
   Cost of land-ratio of city to  
     metropolitan area population  
     density, 1990 
 
 
 .03 
 
 
 .03 
 
 
 .09 
 
 
 .09 
   Construction cost (metro area), 1993 .16**  .16**  .06  .06 
   Property tax rates (metro area), 1990 .15**  .15**  .08  .08 
 
Quality of life 
    
   Crime – ratio of city to metropolitan  
     Area number of crimes per capita,  
     1990 
 
 
 .01 
 
 
 .01 
  
 
-.002 
 
 
-.002 
   Poverty – ratio of city to  
     metropolitan area increase in  
     percentage of persons in poverty,  
     1980-1989 
 
 
 
-.12** 
 
 
 
-.12** 
 
 
 
-.09 
 
 
 
-.09 
   Schools- percent of students in  
      Private schools 
 
-.11* 
 
-.11* 
 
 .02 
 
 .02 
  
 
 
 
 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
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 Single-Family Units Multi-Family Units 
Variables Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Metropolitan area controls     
   Population (metro area), 1990 -.09 -.09  .02  .02 
   Unemployment rate (metro area),  
      1990 
 
-.02 
 
-.02 
 
 .02 
 
 .02 
   Development constraints-miles of  
      shoreline per capita (metro area) 
  
 .03 
 
 .03 
 
 .01 
 
 .01 
Model statistics     
Adjusted R2  .62  .62  .26  .26 
F-value 12.49 12.49 3.51 3.51 
Significance .001 .001 .001 .001 
Number of cases 141 141 141 141 
 
* p<.10 ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (one-tailed test) 
 
a Dependent variables are ratios of central city construction activity per capita to metropolitan area  
  construction activity per capita, 1985-1995. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
enforcement effort does. Central cities that were more proactive in enforcement were less 
able to capture multi-family housing than were those that exerted less effort. Enforcement 
effort summarizes activities such as public information about code requirements, 
frequency of plan checking and building inspections, and vigor with which legal 
prosecution is pursued. Apparently these activities tend to discourage multi-family 
housing, while the practices that comprise the measures of enforcement strategy do not 
have such an effect. Decomposition of the effort index into its constituent parts indicates 
that the effort enforcement agencies put into public information about code standards, 
plan checking, inspections, and legal prosecution accounts for the negative effect. Effort 
expended on surveillance to detect building without a permit, technical assistance, and 
public relations does not have a negative effect on the construction of multi-family 
housing. 
 
 There are two possible reasons for differences in the effects of enforcement 
strategy and effort on the construction of single-family-detached and multi-family 
housing. First, homebuilders active in central cities may be smaller firms that are more 
sensitive to the hassles and costly delays implied by the use of deterrent enforcement 
practices such as stop work orders. Firms building multi-family housing may be larger 
and more adequately financed, so that they can take these costs in stride. In addition, they 
may be more professional in orientation, so that they are less likely to violate code 
standards and less subject to the costs of deterrent enforcement actions. Second, however, 
enforcement effort also implies that firms are less likely to be able to evade the costs of 
complying with code standards. For example, in our previous research, we found that 
enforcement effort is a strong predictor of the degree of compliance with code 
requirements that enforcement agencies have been able to achieve (Burby, May and 
Paterson 1998 and Burby et al. 2000). If they are unable to evade the extra costs of 
complying with code standards, developers of multi-family housing may shift their 
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construction projects to suburban jurisdictions where these costs are less burdensome or 
where less effort is expended on securing compliance. These explanations are mutually 
consistent and seem plausible given the likely characteristics of the firms constructing 
single-family-detached and multi-family housing in central cities. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
 This paper has examined the effects of building code enforcement strategy and 
effort on the ability of central cities to capture single-family-detached and multi-family 
housing construction within their metropolitan areas. We have seen that in response to 
pressures in their operating environment agencies pursue different strategies in their 
attempts to attain compliance with building code standards. Larger cities and those with 
strong political support for enforcement tend to pursue a strategy of strict enforcement, 
which emphasizes standardization of enforcement tasks, provision of technical 
assistance, and the use of deterrence (e.g., stop work orders, fines, etc.) to bring about 
compliance. Smaller cities that want to exert a strong effort on enforcement, but have to 
cope with more politicization of enforcement and greater opposition from various 
constituencies tend to employ a creative strategy of enforcement. This strategy also 
emphasizes the use of deterrence, but it tolerates more flexibility in the way inspectors 
and plan checkers actually apply it. Smaller cities that are less intent on making a strong 
enforcement effort, typically in response to economic stagnation and political pressures 
to avoid antagonizing economic interests, tend to use an accommodative enforcement 
strategy. This strategy involves the use of fewer enforcement practices and less effort in 
undertaking various enforcement tasks than agencies pursuing strict or creative 
enforcement strategies. 
 
 These choices central cities make about enforcement have a direct effect on their 
ability to compete for housing construction within their metropolitan areas. In general, 
the more vigorously cities pursued code enforcement, either in terms of the use of strict 
or creative enforcement strategies, or in terms of the effort they devoted to enforcement, 
the less successful they were in capturing new housing construction. Enforcement 
strategies have this effect on the construction of single-family-detached housing units, 
while code enforcement effort suppresses multi-family housing. Contrary to our 
expectations, the greater flexibility and use of incentives that characterizes a creative 
enforcement strategy does not lessen the adverse effects of deterrent enforcement 
practices, which the creative and strict enforcement strategies have in common.   
 
Our findings suggest that if central cities cut back on the use of deterrent 
enforcement practices, such as stop work orders and fines, they will enhance their ability 
to capture a greater proportion of single-family detached housing within their 
metropolitan areas. This is important, because our earlier research indicates that of all 
types of private-sector construction (i.e., single- and multi-family housing, retail, office, 
and industrial), central cities are doing worst in capturing single-family housing (Burby 
et al. 2000). The impacts of this poor performance are exacerbated by the fact that such 
housing accounts for about half of all private-sector construction activity within 
metropolitan areas. In contrast, multi-family housing accounts for just over 10 percent of 
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construction activity, and central cities have held their own with suburban areas in 
competition for multi-family projects. 
 
Because of the importance of enforcement effort in attaining compliance, we 
think it would be unwise for central cities to cease being proactive about code 
enforcement in order to garner a higher proportion of multi-family housing within their 
metropolitan areas. If our supposition that effort reinforces the adverse effects of obsolete 
code standards that raise construction costs are correct, however, these findings do 
reinforce the need for central cities to take a hard look at the construction requirements 
embodied in their building codes. Our findings provide indirect support for the 
conclusion that multi-family housing construction could be stimulated if code standards 
were less onerous. 
 
 In conclusion, the building code burden on central city housing construction is 
real. Code enforcement choices cities have made have reduced their ability to capture 
both single-family-detached and multi-family housing. Central cities can lessen this 
effect on the construction of single-family detached housing if they de-emphasize the use 
of deterrence as a way to bring about compliance. This can be done without threatening 
the attainment of compliance with code standards, as long as cities continue to mount a 
vigorous enforcement effort. A continuing cost of vigorous enforcement, however, will 
be a somewhat reduced ability to capture multi-family housing. To counter this unwanted 
effect, cities should pay close attention to the cost implications of the code standards 
required in multi-family construction. We suspect that by eliminating costly building 
code requirements that contribute little to building safety, cities can enhance their ability 
to capture multi-family housing construction. In the meantime, however, we have shown 
that cities can begin to beat the building code burden for single-family housing by 
reorienting their enforcement practices to avoid the construction delays and nuisance 
effects that accompany the use of sanctions to bring about compliance with code 
standards. This would be no small accomplishment. 
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Notes
 
1 See Aldendefer and Blashfield (1984) for an overview of cluster analysis.  We employed the 
K-means statistical routine in the SPSS for Windows statistical package.  The clustering is based 
on the Euclidean distance between the unstandardized measures of each of the five types of 
enforcement practices listed in Table 1 (each measured on the same scale of 0 to 100).  
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Appendix.  Measurement of Variables 
 
 
 
Variable  
Source 
Mean (s.d.) 
 
Measurement 
Construction activity   
Central city single-family housing 
success ratio– number of units 
   
U.S. Census 1985-
1995 
.55 (.38) 
Number of central city single-family detached 
houses constructed 1985-1995 per capita/ 
number of metropolitan area single-family 
detached houses constructed 1985-1995 per 
capita (sq. rt. Transformation used in analysis) 
Note: in cases where data for a given year were 
missing, the mean of the 11-year period was 
substituted for that value. In no cases was more 
than one year of data missing for a city in the 
sample. 
Central city multi-family housing 
success ratio – number of units 
 
U.S. Census 1985-
1995 
1.06 (.50) 
Number of central city multi-family housing 
units constructed 1985-1995 per capita/ number 
of metropolitan area multi-family housing units 
constructed 1985-1995 per capita (sq. rt. 
transformation used in analysis) (see above) 
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Enforcement  
Strict enforcement strategy 
 
Derived by authors 
using approach 
explained in  May 
and Burby 1998 
.28 (.45) 
 
Derived from Cluster Analysis of indexes of 
enforcement practices (see May & Burby 
1998). Coded as a dummy variable: 1 – agency 
employs strict enforcement strategy; 0 – agency 
employs another enforcement strategy. 
Creative enforcement strategy Derived by authors 
using approach 
explained in May 
and Burby 1998 
.30 (.46) 
Derived from Cluster Analysis of indexes of 
enforcement practices (see May & Burby 
1998). Coded as a dummy variable: 1 – agency 
employs creative enforcement strategy; 0 – 
agency employs another enforcement strategy. 
Accommodative enforcement 
strategy 
 
Derived by authors 
using approach 
explained in May 
and Burby 1998 
.42 (.49) 
Derived from Cluster Analysis of indexes of 
enforcement practices (see May & Burby 
1998). Coded as a dummy variable: 1 – agency 
employs accommodative enforcement strategy; 
0 – agency employs another enforcement 
strategy. 
 Enforcement effort 
      
Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
35.6 (6.2) 
Index of overall effort a locality makes to 
enforce building standards. Mean of building 
official rating (scale 1 to 5) of degree of effort 
expended by the agency on seven tasks: public 
relations, surveillance, plan checking, 
inspection, legal prosecution, technical 
assistance, public awareness. Alpha = .69 
Deterrent enforcement 
practices 
Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
53.2  (18.0) 
Index based on use of thirteen different 
deterrent enforcement practices (see practices 
listed in Table 1). Alpha = .70 
Discretionary enforcement 
practices 
Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
(23.0) 
Index based on use of five different 
discretionary enforcement practices (see 
practices listed in Table 1). Alpha = .57 
Incentive enforcement practices Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
25.9 (21.2) 
Index based on use of six different incentive 
enforcement practices (see practices listed in 
Table 1). Alpha = .45 
Technical assistance enforcement 
practices 
Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
53.0 (24.1) 
Index based on use of six different technical 
assistance enforcement practices (see practices 
listed in Table 1). Alpha = .58 
Standardization and supervision 
enforcement practices 
Derived by authors 
from Burby, May 
& Paterson 1998 
65.6 (22.3) 
Index based on use of nine different 
standardization and supervision enforcement 
practices (see practices listed in Table 1). 
Alpha = .60 
Demand for housing/buildings   
Population-proportion of  
   metropolitan population living  
   in central city, 1990 
 
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census 
(1993c) data 
.64 (.15) 
Transformation: population of central 
city/population of metropolitan area (sq. rt.) 
Income-ratio of central city to  
   metropolitan area median per  
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census 
Transformation: central city median per capita 
income/metropolitan area median per capita 
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  capita income, 1990 (1993c) data 
.97 (.10) 
income (sq. rt) 
 
 
Spending power – ratio of city to 
   metropolitan area per capita  
   retail sales, 1982 
 
 
 
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census 
(1984) data 
1.29 (.33) 
 
 
Transformation: central city retail sales per 
capita/metropolitan area retail sales per capita 
(sq. rt.) 
 
 
Metropolitan population growth, 
   1980-1990 
   
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census 
(1993c, 1983) data 
823.47 (107.97) 
1990 population – 1980 population (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan income growth (per  
   capita), 1980–1989 
 
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census 
(1993c, 1983) data 
84.46 (11.42) 
1990 median per capita income – 1980 per 
capita income/1980 median per capita income 
(sq. rt.) 
Development opportunities   
Land area-percentage increase in  
   city land area,1980-1989 
  
Derived by authors 
from ICMA, 1997 
3.89 (1.52) 
Land area 1990 – land area 1980/land area 
1980 (sq. rt.) 
Obsolescence-ratio of city to  
   Metropolitan area percentage of  
   Housing built prior to 1940 
U.S. Census, 1993a 
1.00 (.03) 
Percentage of housing in 1990 built before 
1980 (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan housing shortage,  
   1990 
  
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census, 
1982, 1992, 1993c) 
6.98 (1.37) 
Actual 1990 median house value – predicted 
1990 median house value with 1990 predicted 
value = c + 1980 median house value + change 
in median family income 1980-199). Positive 
sign indicates housing shortage. (sq. rt.) 
Development costs   
Cost of land-ratio of city to  
   metropolitan area population   
   density, 1990 
     
Derived by authors 
from U.S. Census, 
1993b 
1.83 (.40) 
Population density of central city/population 
density of metropolitan area (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan residential  
   construction cost, 1993 
Ferguson, 1996 
.97 (.063) 
Metropolitan construction cost index based on 
relative cost of materials and labor (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan nonresidential 
   construction cost, 1993 
Ferguson, 1996 
.97 (.061) 
Metropolitan construction cost index based on 
relative cost of materials and labor (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan property tax index,  
   1990 
Boyer, 1989 
9.73 (2.99) 
Places rated index of property tax rates (sq. rt.) 
Quality of life   
Poverty – ratio of city to  
   metropolitan area increase in  
   percentage of persons in  
   poverty,  1980-1989 
U.S. Census, 1993c 
1 (.03) 
Central city percentage of census tracts with 
20%+ of households below poverty level 
income/metropolitan percentage of census 
tracts with 20%+ of households below poverty 
level income (sq. rt.) 
Crime – ratio of city to  
    metropolitan area number of  
    part 1 crimes per capita, 1990 
      
U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1992; U.S. 
Census, 1993c 
1.56 (.42) 
Total number of Part 1 crimes (murders, rapes, 
robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, 
larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and 
arsons)/central city population 
Percent of metropolitan area  
   students in public schools 
Boyer, 1989 
9.45 (0.28) 
Percent of students attending public schools 
(sq. rt) 
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Characteristics of metropolitan  
   area: 
  
 
Metropolitan population, 1990 
 
 
U.S. Census, 1993c 
797.67 (496.13) 
 
1990 metropolitan population (000) (sq. rt.) 
Metropolitan unemployment rate,  
   1990 
U.S. Census, 1993c 
6.15 (1.67) 
1990 unemployment rate 
Development constraints: miles of 
   metropolitan area shoreline  
 
Calculated by 
authors from atlas 
maps 
.066 (.12) 
Miles of shoreline (not including small inland 
lakes) bordering metropolitan area (sq. rt.) 
 
Data sources: 
 
Boyer, R. (1989). Places rated almanac: Your guide to finding the best places to live in America. New 
York: Prentice-Hall. 
Burby, R. J., May, P. J., & Paterson, R. B. (1998). Improving compliance with regulations: Choices and 
outcomes for local government. Journal of the American Planning Association, 64 (3): 324-334. 
Ferguson, J. H. (Ed.). (1996). Mean square foot costs, 1997: Residential, commercial, industrial, 
institutional. Kingston, MA: R. S. Means. 
International City/County Management Association. 1997. The municipal yearbook. Washington, DC: 
ICMA. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1983. 1980 census of population: Characteristics of the population/general 
social and economic characteristics. Washington, DC: The Bureau. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1983. 1980 census of population: General social and economic characteristics. 
Washington, DC: The Bureau. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1984. 1982 census of retail trade: Geographic area series. Washington, DC: 
The Bureau. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1993a. 1990 census of housing: Detailed housing characteristics. Washington, 
DC: The Bureau. 
U.S. Bureua of the Census. 1993b. 1990 census of population: Social and economic characteristics. 
Washington, DC: The Bureau.  
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1993c. 1990 census of population and housing: Summary of population and 
housing characteristics. Washington, DC: The Bureau. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Manufacturing and Construction Division. (1985-1995). Building permits. 
Annual series. Washington, DC: The Bureau. 
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1992. Uniform crime reports for 1990. Series 
55100. Washington, DC: The Department. 
 
